Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol

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Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol

Michael NeuderDaniel J. MorozRithvik RaoDavid C. Parkes

Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols give rise to complex modeling challenges. We analyze the recently-updated Tezos Proof-of-Stake protocol and demonstrate that how sometimes rational participants are incentivized to behave dishonestly.

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